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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MICHAEL T. BILANZICH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
(CORRECTED)

vs.
JOHN LONETTI, an individual, EUNES
I. LONETTI, an individual, and JDL
HOLDINGS, L.C.,

Case No. 20040640-CA

Defendants/Appellees

I.
JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78-2-2(3)0) and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

II.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES FOR REVIEW
Did the trial court commit error in ruling that Plaintiff/Appellant Michael T.
Bilanzich ("Bilanzich") is not entitled to recover his attorney's fees incurred in these
consolidated actions under the Guaranty executed by Bilanzich and the Note that

Bilanzich guaranteed on the basis that the court had previously held that the Guaranty was
unenforceable because a condition precedent to Bilanzich's liability on the Guaranty had
not occurred? This issue presents a question of law and the trial court's decision is
reviewed for correctness. Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d
1273, 1277 (Utah 1998).
This issue was preserved below. [R. 2527-2536]

III.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56.5 is determinative of this case. That statute provides:
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that prevails
in a civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other
writing executed after April 28, 1986 where the provisions of the
promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one party to
recover attorney's fees.
IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW.
This case arose out of the efforts of Reese's Enterprise, Inc. ("REI") to develop a
motel near the entrance of Zions National Park and Bilanzich's execution of a Guaranty
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of a Note executed by REI in favor of John and Eunes Lonetti (the "Lonettis") which was
assigned to JDL Holdings, L.C. ("JDL") of which they are the sole members.
Bilanzich commenced this action in August, 2000. [R. 1] Bilanzich's Second
Amended Complaint asserted a claim for declaratory relief against the Lonettis and JDL
that Bilanzich was not liable under the Guaranty because REI had never obtained a $3.5
Million loan, which was a condition precedent to Bilanzich's liability on the Guaranty.
Bilanzich also sought rescission of the Guaranty on that same basis and upon other
grounds, including fraud, and asserted a claim for unjust enrichment. [R. 1306-1330]
JDL filed a separate action against Bilanzich (the "JDL Action"), seeking to
recover on the Guaranty. [R. 2499] The JDL Action was consolidated with the Bilanzich
case. [R. 671]
On August 15, 2003, Bilanzich filed a motion for partial summary judgment
against the Lonettis and JDL both on JDL's complaint against Bilanzich on the Guaranty
and on Bilanzich's declaratory relief claim. [R. 1725] Bilanzich contended that as a
matter of law the Guaranty was not enforceable against Bilanzich because a condition
precedent to Bilanzich's liability under the Guaranty was that REI obtain a $3.5 Million
construction loan, which condition precedent had never occurred. [R. 1728-1739] The
Lonettis and JDL opposed the partial summary judgment motion on the ground that
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Bilanzich was not a party to the Term Sheet and that the Guaranty was unconditional. [R.
2082-2090]
On December 15, 2003, the trial court granted partial summary judgment,
determining that the Guaranty was unenforceable because the condition precedent to
Bilanzich's liability thereunder that REI would obtain the $3.5 Million construction loan
had never occurred. [R. 2221-2223] The Lonettis and JDL have not appealed this
decision. On March 9, 2004, pursuant to Rule 54(b), the district court entered final
judgment in favor of Bilanzich on his declaratory relief claim and on JDL's claim against
Bilanzich on the Guaranty. [R. 2424] Thereafter, Bilanzich agreed with the Lonettis and
JDL to dismiss his rescission and unjust enrichment claims and the Lonettis agreed to
waive their right to appeal the judgment. [R. 2409; 2421; 2435]
Bilanzich filed a motion for an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the
Guaranty. [R. 2385] The Lonettis and JDL opposed the motion on the basis that: (1)
Bilanzich was not a party to the Note; (2) the Guaranty supposedly did not contain an
attorney's fee provision; (3) the claim for the attorney fees and costs was supposedly
contrary to a settlement with the Lonettis and JDL (even though there was no agreement
whatsoever to waive attorney's fees and costs); and (4) the amount claimed was not
reasonable. [R. 2427-2438]
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The court held a hearing on the attorney's fee motion on May 4, 2004. At the
hearing, Judge Shumate stated that the Guaranty did in fact provide for attorney's fees.
[R. 2248 at 2-3] However, Judge Shumate asked for supplemental briefing on the issue
of whether the court could award attorney's fees when the court had already determined
that the Guaranty was unenforceable against Bilanzich because the condition precedent
had not occurred. [Id. at 5] The parties subsequently filed supplemental memoranda on
this issue. [R. 2520; 2527]
Judge Shumate issued a Minute Entry filed June 23, 2004, denying the motion for
attorney's fees and striking the scheduled June 29, 2004 hearing. [R. 2560] Bilanzich
filed a Notice of Appeal on July 7, 2004 and an Amended Notice of Appeal on July 14,
2004. [R. 2562]

B. STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Defendant REI was developing a motel near the entrance to Zions National
Park in Springdale, Utah. On December 31, 1996, the Lonettis made a loan to REI with
respect to the project. REI executed a $1,780,600.00 Trust Deed Note (the "Note") in
favor of the Lonettis and a Deed of Trust encumbering the motel property as security for
repayment of the Note. [R. 1822; 2389]
2. On April 5, 1998, REI and the Lonettis signed a written Agreement modifying
certain provisions of the Note and increasing the outstanding balance of the Note to
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$2,167,717.00. The modification contained the following reciprocal attorney's fee
provision: "If any action is instituted with respect to this Agreement or supporting
documents, the prevailing party shall be entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs
to be paid by the other parties." [R. 1822-1823; 2389; 2397-2399]
3. The Lonettis subsequently filed suit against REI to foreclose their Deed of
Trust and collect the Note. [R. 2084-2085]
4. The Lonettis and REI thereafter entered into a settlement agreement. Under the
agreement, at closing the Note was to be reduced by a $250,000.00 payment, the Lonettis
were to receive personal guarantees of Bilanzich and an REI principal, and the Lonettis
were to subordinate their Deed of Trust to a maximum $3.5 Million Trust Deed in favor
of an institutional lender. [R. 1730-1731; 1823]1
5. On September 20, 1999, REI, the Lonettis and Bilanzich entered into a written
agreement entitled "Term Sheet". [R. 2083] As part of this agreement, REI was to obtain
Bilanzich's personal Guaranty of the Note that would be released to the Lonettis at
closing. The Term Sheet specifically provided that u[t]he closing is contingent on
financing being obtained by REI from an institutional lender" in the amount of $3.5
Million. The Term Sheet further provided that "[i]f financing is not obtained, the closing

1

Another alternative under the agreement was that REI would pay the Lonettis in
full at closing. That did not occur.
6

will not occur, all items in escrow will be returned to the party depositing them, and
Lonetti will foreclose and realize on the security." [R. 1730-1731]
6. On September 30, 1999, Bilanzich executed a Guaranty of the Note in favor of
the Lonettis which was deposited in escrow. [R. 2401]
7. REI never obtained a $3.5 Million loan. Instead, only $300,000.00 was ever
disbursed by the lender. [R. 1732] Despite that fact, the Bilanzich Guaranty was released
from escrow. [R. 2084-2085] The Guaranty contained the following attorney's fee
provision:
This Guaranty includes all principal, interest, costs, expenses and attorney's
fees incurred in collection of the Note and in realization of the security. [R.
2108]
8. The Lonettis subsequently assigned all their rights with respect to the REI Note
and Deed of Trust and the Bilanzich Guaranty to JDL. [R. 1734]
9. REI filed bankruptcy in Nevada. JDL successfully moved for relief from stay
in that bankruptcy to foreclose its Deed of Trust on the REI property. In connection with
that motion, John Lonetti testified under oath in his affidavit and Lonettis' counsel argued
to the bankruptcy court, that the Subordination Agreement the Lonettis had executed
subordinating to the $3.5 Million loan was not effective because the loan was never fully
funded. [R. 1732-1734]
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V.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Both the Guaranty and the Note included attorney's fees provisions pursuant to
which the Lonettis and JDL would have been entitled to recover attorney's fees had they
prevailed in their attempt to recover from Bilanzich on the Guaranty. Thus, under the
reciprocal provisions of Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56.5, Bilanzich is entitled to recover
attorney's fees.
The fact that Judge Shumate granted summary judgment in favor of Bilanzich
determining he was not liable on his Guaranty because a condition precedent to
enforcement of the Guaranty - - funding of the $3.5 Million construction loan - - had not
occurred does not render the attorney's fees provision unenforceable. Judge Shumate did
not rescind the Guaranty but only held that the condition precedent had not occurred and,
therefore, Bilanzich had no liability. Moreover, even if it were assumed that the district
court's decision had the effect of rescinding or voiding the Guaranty, Bilanzich would
still be entitled to recover attorney's fees under the reciprocal attorney's fee statute. Both
Bilanzich's Complaint and the JDL Action were "based upon" a written contract that
allows at least one party to recover fees. It is not necessary to recovery under this statute
that the lawsuit seek to enforce a written contract even though the JDL Action did so.
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VI.
ARGUMENT

A. THE GUARANTY CLEARLY CONTAINS AN ATTORNEY'S FEES
PROVISION.
Pursuant to the Guaranty, Bilanzich agreed to "absolutely guarantee payment...
of a Promissory Note" executed by REI with a current principal balance at the time the
Guaranty was executed of $2 Million. The Guaranty contained the following attorney's
fees provision:
This Guaranty includes all principal, interest, costs, expenses, and
attorney's fees incurred in collection of the Note and realization of the
security.
In the court below, the Lonettis and JDL erroneously argued, without any
supporting authority, that this provision only obligated Bilanzich to pay attorney's fees
incurred by the Lonettis and JDL in litigating with REI on the Note and did not obligate
Bilanzich to pay attorney's fees incurred by the Lonettis and JDL in attempting to recover
on the Note by litigating with Bilanzich to recover on the Guaranty of the Note.
However, because Bilanzich guaranteed payment of the Note, the attorney's fees incurred
by JDL in seeking to recover on the Guaranty were in fact fees incurred in collecting the
Note. Thus, m Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Cardinal Fuels, Inc., 872 F.2d 416, 1989 WL 28404
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(4 Cir. 1989), the court affirmed a judgment for attorney's fees where the guarantee
agreement provided that the guarantor would pay "reasonable attorney's fees incurred in
collection of the note." Id. at *2. [Quotation Omitted]
The Lonettis and JDL clearly understood this fact that they were entitled to recover
attorney's fees from Bilanzich on the Guaranty if they prevailed. In JDL's complaint
seeking to recover on the Guaranty, JDL prayed for recovery of attorney's fees. [R. 2501]
Similarly, in their answer to Bilanzich's claims with respect to the Guaranty, the Lonettis
prayed for attorney's fees. [R. 85]
In addition, the Note itself obligated REI to pay attorney's fees incurred by the
Lonettis in collecting the Note. Thus, REI was liable for any fees incurred to recover on
the Guaranty of the Note. Because Bilanzich was liable for all of REI's obligations under
the Note, Bilanzich was also liable for the fees incurred in collecting the Guaranty of the
Note. Connecticut Nat'I Bank v. Foley, 560 A.2d 475 (Conn. App. 1989) involved this
very situation. In Foley, the guarantor agreed to pay "any other charges, fees or expenses
owed by the borrower under the loan agreement." Id. at 478 n.2. The note stated that the
borrower was obligated to pay "reasonable attorney's fees incurred in collection of all or
part of his note." Id. at 478. [Quotations Omitted] The court held that because the
borrower was obligated to pay any attorney's fees incurred in collecting the note,
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including attorney's fees incurred in collecting on the guarantee of the note, the guarantor
was likewise obligated to pay such attorney's fees.
Accordingly, the Guaranty clearly contained an attorney's fee provision which
would have obligated Bilanzich to pay attorney fees had the Lonettis and JDL prevailed.
Therefore, as the prevailing party, Bilanzich was entitled to recover his attorney's fees
under Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56.5, which provides:
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that prevails
in a civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other
writing executed after April 28, 1986 where the provisions of the
promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one party to
recover attorney's fees.

B. THE FACT THAT THE DISTRICT COURT FOUND THE GUARANTY
TO BE UNENFORCEABLE BECAUSE THE CONDITION PRECEDENT TO
LIABILITY HAD NOT OCCURRED DOES NOT DEFEAT BILANZICH1 S
RIGHT TO RECOVER ATTORNEY'S FEES.
Judge Shumate's order denying Bilanzich's motion for attorney's fees and costs
does not expressly state the basis for the ruling. However, based on his statements at the
summary judgment hearing and his request for supplemental briefing, Judge Shumate
presumably denied the motion on the basis that his prior ruling that the Guaranty was
unenforceable because the condition precedent of REI obtaining a $3.5 Million
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construction loan had not occurred also rendered the attorney's fees provision
unenforceable. It is respectfully submitted that this ruling was in error.
In their supplemental memorandum in opposition to the motion for award of
attorney's fees, the Lonettis and JDL relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in BLT
Investment Co. v. Snow, 586 P.2d 456 (Utah 1978) for their argument that Bilanzich was
not entitled to recover attorney's fees because the court had determined the Guaranty was
unenforceable. BLT is clearly distinguishable.
In BLT, plaintiff sued for specific performance of a contract. The defendant
sought rescission of the contract. The trial court granted rescission based upon a failure
of a condition precedent to the effectiveness of the contract and awarded the defendant
attorney's fees pursuant to a contractual provision. The Supreme Court affirmed the
rescission order, but reversed the award of attorney's fees. The Court stated that a "party
may not avoid the contract and, at the same time, claim the benefits of the provision for
attorney's fees." Id. at 458.
In the case at bar, Bilanzich did not obtain an order rescinding the contract.2
Bilanzich's defense did not go to whether the Guaranty contract had been formed and
Judge Shumate's order did not void that contract. Instead, Bilanzich defended on the

2

Bilanzich's rescission claim was dismissed by stipulation of the parties. Cf.
Bennett v. Baugh, 985 P.2d 1282, 1284 (Or. 1999) (attorneys fees properly awarded
where defendant sought rescission but judgment did not award it).
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basis that he had no liability on the Guaranty because a condition precedent to his liability
had never occurred. The failure of a condition precedent relieves a party of any
obligation to perform under the contract. [R. 2409; 2421; 2435] Kinsman v. Kinsman,
748 P.2d 210, 213 (Utah App. 1988); Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d 275,
281 (Utah App. 1987). There is nothing inconsistent with Bilanzich arguing that he had
no liability under his Guaranty because the $3.5 Million construction loan was never
obtained and Bilanzich arguing that he is entitled to recover attorney's fees incurred in
establishing that he has no liability under his Guaranty and defending JDL's claim on the
Guaranty. Further, BLTwas decided before the enactment of Utah Code Ann. §78-2756.5 which does not limit a party's entitlement to attorney fees based upon the nature of
the claim or defense asserted by the party so long as the lawsuit is based upon a written
contract which provides for attorney fees.
Moreover, even if it were assumed for argument that the district court's decision
had the effect of rescinding or voiding the Guaranty, Bilanzich would still be entitled to
recover attorney fees under Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56.5. That statute provides for
attorney fees to the prevailing party in any action "based upon" a written contract that
allows at least one party to recover attorney fees. It is not necessary to recovery under
this statute that the lawsuit be to enforce a written contract. Certainly, JDL's complaint
for recovery on the Guaranty and Bilanzich's claim for declaratory relief that he was not
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liable on the Guaranty were civil actions "based upon" a written contract providing for
attorney's fees. By obtaining a judgment that he was not liable on the Guaranty on the
basis that the Guaranty was unenforceable because the condition precedent to liability had
not occurred, Bilanzich was undeniably the prevailing party in a suit based upon the
written Guaranty.
InAnglin v. Contracting Fabrication Machining, Inc., 2001 UT App. 341, f 11, 37
P.3d 267, this court recognized that the purpose of this §78-27-56.5 was to "creat[e] a
level playing field for all parties to a promissory note." See also Hsu v. Abbara, 891 P.2d
804, 809 (Cal. 1995) (California's reciprocal attorney's fees statute was "enacted to
establish mutuality of remedy where a contractual provision makes recovery of attorney's
fees available for only one party, and to prevent oppressive use of one-sided attorney's
fees provisions"). Had JDL and the Lonettis prevailed, they would have been entitled to
attorney fees as they alleged in their pleadings. Having defeated their claims, and
established that he was not liable on the Guaranty, Bilanzich should be awarded his
attorney's fees to create a level playing field.
Although Bilanzich has been unable to find any Utah cases directly on point,
courts in other states have held that attorney's fees were properly awarded under
reciprocal attorney fee statutes even when rescission of a contract was obtained.
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In Bovard v. American Horse Enterprises, Inc., 247 Cal. Rptr. 340-346 (Cal. App.
1988), the court held that under California's reciprocal attorney's fees statute, a party
prevailing on a claim that a contract is inapplicable, invalid, unenforceable, or nonexistent is entitled to recover attorney's fees if the opposing party would have been
entitled to recover attorney's fees had it prevailed unless the contract is held
unenforceable because of illegality. Likewise, in Yuba Cypress Housing Partners, Ltd. v.
Area Developers, 120 Cal. Rptr.2d 273, 277 (Cal. App. 2002), the court held that a
plaintiff who successfully voided a contract was nevertheless entitled to recover
attorney's fees under the attorney's fee provision in the contract. Thus, in Hsu v. Abbara,
supra, the California Supreme Court stated:
It is now settled that a party is entitled to attorney's fees under Section 1717
even when the party prevails on grounds the contract is inapplicable,
invalid, unenforceable or non-existent if the other party would have been
entitled to attorney's fees had it prevailed. 891 P.2d at 808 [Quotations and
Citation Omitted]
To the same effect, see Carey v. Wallner, 725 P.2d 557, 562 (Mont. 1986) (under
Montana's reciprocal attorney's fee statute, plaintiff was entitled to recover attorney's
fees and costs incurred in successfully rescinding a purchase contract); Hackney v. Sunset
Beach Investments, 644 P.2d 138, 142 (Wash. App. 1982) (the court reversed the trial
court's refusal to award the purchasers attorney's fees incurred in successfully bringing a
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rescission action under the Washington reciprocal attorney's fees statute which applied to
"any action on a contract" that provided for attorney's fees).3
JDL and its sole members, the Lonettis, attempted to recover millions of dollars
from Bilanzich on his Guaranty. Had they prevailed, they would have been entitled to
recover the attorney's fees for which they prayed. However, Bilanzich successfully
proved he was not liable on the Guaranty. Bilanzich is therefore entitled to recover
attorney's fees under §78-27-56.5.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the order denying
attorney fees should be reversed and the case remanded with instructions that Bilanzich is
entitled to an award of his reasonable attorney fees in an amount to be determined by the
district court.

3

The only contrary authority Bilanzich has found is Autolend IAP, Inc. v. Auto
Depot, Inc., 11 P.3d 693, 697 (Or. App. 2000), in which the court held that Oregon's
former reciprocal attorney fees statute did not sanction an award of attorney's fees to a
defendant who successfully proved that a contract did not exist. However, the Oregon
Legislature later amended the statute in 2001 to make the statute truly reciprocal by
making it applicable to any suit "in which a claim is made based on a contract." This
revised statute is more analogous to Utah's statute which permits an award of attorney's
fees in any action "based upon" a written agreement providing for attorney's fees.
16

DATED this

of March, 2005.
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
:A->—-

JEFFERSON W. GROSS
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A
ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

i :"
: LLl 1 J

..ii v..

RICHARD D. BURBIDGE (#0492)
JEFFERSON W. GROSS (#8339)
J. RYAN MITCHELL (#9362)
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
215 South State Street, Suite 920
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-6677
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MICHAEL T. BILANZICH,
Plaintiff,

JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK &
McDONOUGH, a professional
corporation, D. WILLIAMS RONNOW,
an individual, REESE'S ENTERPRISES,
INC., a Nevada corporation, JOHN
LONETTI, an individual, EUNES I.
LONETTI, an individual, CAMBRIDGE
CAPITAL GROUP, INC., a Delaware
corporation, CAMBRIDGE HOLDINGS,
INC., a Delaware corporation, JOHN C.
HOWE, an individual, FOOTBRIDGE
LIMITED TRUST, a Bermuda corporation
OLD HILL PARTNERS, a partnership and
DOES IV through X,

)>
1
)

)
;)
;
;)
]
]
]
;
;
;
;
]
;
J

ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Civil No. 010500411
Judge Shumate

Defendants.

On November 18, 2003, at 10:30 a.m., Plaintiff Michael T. Bilanzich's ("Bilanzich")
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment came on for hearing in the above-entitled Court, the

Honorable James L. Shumate presiding. Jefferson W. Gross of Burbidge & Mitchell
appeared on behalf of Bilanzich; Brent M. Brindley of Durham Jones & Pinegar appeared on
behalf of Defendants John Lonetti and Eunes Lonetti, and Defendant/Consolidated Case
Plaintiff JDL Holdings, L.C.; Edwin C. Barnes of Clyde Snow Sessions & Swenson
appeared on behalf of Defendants D. Williams Ronnow and Jones Waldo Holbrook &
McDonough; J. Greggory Hardman of Snow Jensen & Reece appeared on behalf Defendants
Footbridge Limited Trust, Old Hill Partners and John C. Howe; and Mitchell R. Barker
appeared on behalf of Defendants Cambridge Capital Group, Inc., Cambridge Holdings,
Inc., and Eric Cummings.
After considering the arguments of counsel, both written and oral, after considering
those evidentiary materials submitted by the parties pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e), after
taking judicial notice of those matters and pleadings filed in In Re Reeses Enterprises, Inc.,
Case No. BK-S-0019134-RCJ in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Nevada, and having considered as true those materials facts identified by Bilanzich in his
moving papers which were not disputed by Defendants pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah
Rules of Judicial Administration, the Court determines and finds that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact which precludes entry of partial summary judgment as prayed by
Bilanzich.
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In particular, and among other things, the Court determines that there is no genuine
issue of material fact as to the non-completion of either Alternative One or Two of the
September 20, 1999, Term Sheet signed by Bilanzich and Defendants John Lonetti and Eunes
Lonetti (the "Term Sheet"). The failure of an express condition precedent set forth in the
Term Sheet renders Bilanzich's written guaranty unenforceable regardless of whether or not
the guaranty was delivered to Defendants John Lonetti and Eunes Lonetti out of escrow. In
addition, the affidavit filed by Defendant John Lonetti in the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the District of Nevada for the purposes of successfully obtaining leave from the automatic
bankruptcy stay to foreclose on security is a compelling admission that the express condition
precedent in the Term Sheet did not occur.
Accordingly, Bilanzich is granted partial summary judgment in his favor on his Seventh
Claim for Relief in his Second Amended Complaint and on all claims made against him in the
Complaint of JDL Holdings, L.C. (Case No. 010501650, which was consolidated with this
action on November 1, 2001).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this / ^ d a y of December, 2003.
BY THE COURT:

Honorable James L. Shumate
Fifth District Court Judge
3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On the date below written, the undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed
with all first-class postage pre-paid to:
Ronald C. Barker
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115

Brent M. Brindley
DURHAM, JONES & PINEGAR
192 East 200 North, Third Floor
P.O. Box 400
St. George, Utah 84771-0400

V. Lowry Snow
SNOW, JENSEN & REECE
134 North 200 East, Suite 302
St. George, Utah 84770

Edwin C. Barnes
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON
201 South Main, #1300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

DATED this th$

te.
) day of December, 2003.
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ADDENDUM B
Order deny motion for attorneys fees
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FIFTH DISTRICT COURT-ST GEORGE COU$]Y.
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MICHAEL T BILANZICH,
Plaintiff,

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR_ATTORNEY
FEES

vs .

Case No: 010500411

JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & MCDON,
Defendant.

Judge: JAMES L. SHUMATE
Date: 06/22/2004

Clerk: loris
Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees is Overruled and Denied.
Hearing of June 29, 2004 is Ordered Stricken.

n

mdgfe JAMES L. SHUMA'
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Case No: 010500411
Date:
Jun 23, 2004

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 010500411 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Dated t h i s ^T)

day of

\jJjJf\jP_,

NAME
JEFFERSON W GROSS
ATTORNEY PLA
215 S STATE ST STE 920
SALT LAKE CITY, U T
84111-2311
TERRY L WADE
ATTORNEY DEF
192 E 200 N 3RD FLOOR
ST GEORGE UT 84 77 0
, 2oQL\

.

Deputy Court Clerk
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